Almost 10 years have passed since US forces were deployed to Iraq and Syria as part of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Three administrations later, with new strategic challenges vying for attention and both public opinion and policy veering toward 1930s-style isolationism, an American exit from the region is not being ruled out.
First published by Al Arabiya
Given current Western commitments to the war in Ukraine, mounting concerns about the possibility of conflict over Taiwan, and the decreasing dependence on oil imports from the Gulf, the chances of an abrupt US disengagement from the Middle East, particularly under a Trump-led Republican administration, cannot be overstated.
This is true despite rising concerns about what a US withdrawal from Iraq and northeast Syria might mean for the ongoing fight against extremist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda, even as these groups steadily expand their operations in the ungoverned spaces of Central Asia and the Sahel.
Indeed, the January 3 twin bombing at the shrine of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in Iran’s Kerman and the March 22 massacre at a Moscow concert venue, both claimed by ISIS-Khorasan Province, were only the latest expressions of the group’s continued reach.
There are also fears that a US drawdown in the Middle East could tilt the balance of power in favor of Iran, allowing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its many regional proxies to extend their reach, especially in light of tensions emanating from the Gaza war.
Moves that could embolden Iran
“Any immediate US withdrawal from Iraq would make the US appear weak and as having given in to the pressures from Iran and its Iraqi and regional proxies,” Mohammed A. Salih, a senior fellow at the Philadelphia-based Foreign Policy Research Institute, told Al Arabiya English in an email interview.
“In parallel, this would further strengthen and embolden Iran and its regional allies and solidify their hegemony over large chunks of the region, from Iraq to Lebanon — Syria and Yemen included.”
“The US presence in Iraq and Syria is also significant in the context of the conflict between Israel, Hamas, and Iran and its network of regional proxies. A US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria would enhance the hand of Iran and its regional camp.”
Strategic opportunities for Russia, China
A US withdrawal would also likely offer strategic opportunities for Russia and China. Moscow has already secured a strong foothold in the region, having come to the rescue of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in 2015. A US withdrawal would leave this entirely unchecked.
Beijing, meanwhile, has sensed an opportunity to become a regional power broker, as demonstrated by its mediation of a peace deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran last year. Its failure to take a lead on the Gaza crisis, however, suggests its motives are business and energy rather than the cause of peace.
Undermine stability in Iraq, Syria
Furthermore, a sudden US departure could undermine the stability of Iraq and Syria as they emerge from years of conflict, leading to fresh regional instability, humanitarian crises, and the creation of new potential launchpads for international terrorism.
“A US withdrawal from Iraq and Syria will likely further destabilize these countries, create conditions for the re-emergence of extremist groups, and usher in rivalries among various actors in these countries, backed by regional states, for influence and control of territory and resources and the protection of their respective communities and groups,” said Salih.
Having pulled out of Iraq in 2011, following the 2003 overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the troop surge mounted in response to the bloody sectarian civil war, US forces were again deployed in 2014 at the Iraqi government’s invitation to help combat ISIS.
That summer, the extremist group had conquered a vast swathe of Iraq’s northwest, including its second city, Mosul. In its chaotic retreat, the US-trained Iraqi army surrendered many of its US-supplied weapons and armored vehicles to the insurgents.
With the help of Western airpower, training and equipment, the Iraqi armed forces, in tandem with an assortment of Shia militias under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces, were able to retake much of the country from ISIS by late 2017.
At the same time, the US mission extended to Syria, where the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces had mounted their own resistance to ISIS in the north. In the areas it had liberated, the SDF carved out its own autonomous administration beyond the Assad regime’s control.
Sleeper cells and clandestine networks
ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who had declared the group’s “caliphate” at the Al-Nuri Mosque in Mosul in 2014, was eventually tracked down to a village in Syria that October, where he chose to commit suicide rather than fall into US hands.
Although the group had been territorially defeated in Iraq and Syria, and many of its remaining fighters and leaders were captured or killed in mop-up operations, it is believed that sleeper cells and clandestine networks are still operating across the country.
As such, US and allied forces have agreed to stay on in Iraq, primarily in a training and advisory capacity, to help bolster the Iraqi armed forces.
Syria was a different story, though. Shortly after al-Baghdadi was killed in the fall of 2019, then-US President Donald Trump abruptly announced he would be withdrawing all US forces from northern Syria.
Officials in his own administration were outraged, accusing Trump of subjecting America’s SDF allies to the mercy of ISIS remnants, a resurgent Assad regime, and the Turkish military, which views the SDF as an ideological extension of the leftist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Senior figures, including Trump’s Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and envoy to the anti-ISIS coalition Brett McGurk, warned that abandoning the SDF would undermine trust in future US defense partnerships. Mattis even resigned over the issue.
They also warned that a withdrawal might allow ISIS to mount a resurgence. The danger of this was amply demonstrated in January 2022, when the group staged a daring prison break from an SDF-run facility in Hasakah. Hundreds of fighters were believed to have escaped.
Also vulnerable are SDF-run detention camps such as al-Hol and Roj, which contain thousands of women and children — many of them the wives, widows, and children of ISIS fighters. Resentment and radicalization in these camps is reported to be rife.
Then there is the matter of northeast Syria’s valuable oil fields, which could fall into the hands of extremists or the sanctioned Assad regime without US support to shore up the overstretched SDF.
The backlash in his administration forced Trump to make an abrupt U-turn. Although a US drawdown did occur, a contingent of around 900 personnel remained in the northeast.
“Domestically, the US has long been under pressure to justify its continued presence in Syria and Iraq,” Samantha Teal of the Rojava Information Center, based in the AANES (Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria), told Al Arabiya English.
“Claims that the war against Daesh is finished, however, ignores the reality in northeast Syria — and in Syria more widely.”
“A US withdrawal would threaten the security of AANES’s 22 prisons holding Daesh prisoners — eight of which have been assessed as at high risk of an attack or breakout attempt.”
Although a withdrawal from Iraq and Syria is unlikely in the immediate term, this could change after November’s US presidential election.
“The US is approaching a very important crossroads in the Middle East,” Caroline Rose, director of the Strategic Blind Spots Portfolio at the New Lines Institute, told Al Arabiya English.
“While we won’t see a major drawdown ahead of the election (it’s far too risky), it’s game-on following an inauguration in January — and that is regardless of what administration takes office,” Rose said.
“While the US has an imperative to remain in Iraq and Syria, it has had a difficult time justifying Operation Inherent Resolve’s mandate, given the evolved threat levels of Daesh.”
US President Joe Biden, the incumbent, may also be wary about a repeat of the chaotic Afghan withdrawal of August 2021. A Trump White House, however, may be less squeamish and rather more keen to disengage entirely.
“Minus some spectacular domestic US political shift, the chances of a short-term withdrawal appear low,” said Salih of the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
“All this could change if Donald Trump wins the presidential elections in November and decides to go for a ‘radical’ measure such as pulling the US troops out of Iraq and Syria.”
“It should be noted that this would be a difficult task to pull off for any US president given the circumstances in the region and the broader stakes for US policy at the moment. But even if he withdrew US troops from Iraq and Syria, or reduced their numbers, it is unfathomable to think the US would end its military presence in the broader Middle East.”